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Essay: Iran and the Military 
Option 
Dr. Gregory P. Noone† 
When politicians, pundits, and prognosticators discuss the 
“military option” for Iran it is important to understand that it 
will in all likelihood result in a full scale international armed 
conflict. If the “military option” mission is to eliminate Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities, there is no one target to destroy, bomb, or 
obliterate that will render Iran’s nuclear program dead therefore 
making such an option unlikely to be quick or efficient. A 
conflict with Iran would involve an extensive air campaign and 
probably result in Iran launching missiles at Israel and Eastern 
Europe. The Persian Gulf would effectively be closed off as a 
result of maritime combat and the worldwide threat of terrorist 
attacks would have far reaching consequences. The cost of 
armed conflict with Iran is incalculable with the potential to 
further destabilize the region as well as the global economy. 
The purpose of this essay is not to analyze the agreed upon Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement of July 2015 
between the E3/EU+3 (mainly China, France, Germany, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America) with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.1 Other authors have taken on that task. The 
purpose of this essay is to understand what exactly the “military 
option” means in practice with regards to destroying Iran’s nuclear 
program. 
Let’s be clear: when politicians, pundits, and prognosticators 
discuss the “military option” for Iran we are in fact discussing a full 
on war. If the mission is to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there 
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1. Eric Pichon, Nuclear Deal with Iran—What Are the Implications of the 
14 July 2015 Agreement?, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. BLOG 
(Sept. 2, 2015), http://epthinktank.eu/2015/09/02/nuclear-deal-with-
iran-what-are-the-implications-of-the-14-july-2015-agreement/ 
[https://perma.cc/P8ZH-2Y3Z]. 
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is no one target to destroy, bomb, or obliterate that will render Iran’s 
nuclear program dead. Iran deliberately and effectively spread its 
nuclear program throughout the country, as well as placed it deep 
underground, in order to avoid this very scenario.2 Iran learned its 
lesson from the successful 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osirek nuclear 
reactor that was under construction in Iraq.3 Not only will a single air 
mission not work, even with the Massive Ordinance Penetrator, 
capable of destroying underground facilities, it is highly unlikely that 
a sustained air campaign alone will succeed.4 Instead, combat troops 
will be required on the ground, in a very inhospitable terrain, in order 
to achieve the mission of annihilating Iran’s nuclear capability. In 
other words, the “military option” for Iran will consist of significant 
military action resembling in fact and in law––armed conflict and the 
invasion of a sovereign nation.  
First and foremost, the United States possesses the most powerful 
and professional military in the history of the world and is far 
superior to Iran’s military.5 However, never underestimate the enemy–
–especially on its home soil. Facing an opposing force in a 
conventional military arena is not a problem for the United States 
military, but there are many ways countries may counter 
overwhelming force and Iran is no different.   
Iran has an aging anti-aircraft capacity, but any air campaign 
would still require degrading its radar, anti-aircraft firepower, and air 
force.6 This is not impossible by any means, as the US air power 
 
2. See James S. Robbins, A Grim Prognosis: If Diplomacy Fails, Halting 
Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Ambitions Could Mean a Larger War Than the 
U.S. Is Willing to Take on, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2015/04/24/ending-irans-nuclear-program-would-require-more-
than-a-few-airstrikes [https://perma.cc/3E2R-J8CY] (“Iran has no such 
singlepoint [sic],high vulnerability target, and Warden, [a U.S. Air Force 
combat veteran], notes that Tehran has ‘done a nice job of camouflaging 
[its nuclear program], concealing it, putting it deep underground.’”). 
3. Id. 
4. Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Seeks Mightier Bomb vs. 
Iran, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203363504577187420287
098692 [https://perma.cc/XJ6D-GLBR]. 
5. E.g., Who’s afraid of America?, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21654066-military-
playing-field-more-even-it-has-been-many-years-big 
[https://perma.cc/VL28-ZXR8]. 
6. Elisabeth Bumiller, Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/middleeast/iran-raid-seen-
as-complex-task-for-israeli-military.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/VQK4-9T3N]. 
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consisting of U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force assets 
are far superior to any other nations’, including Iran’s.7 But success 
will come with a cost; Iranians possess the Russian manufactured S-
300 long-range surface-to-air missile system and reportedly purchased 
and received shipment on five additional S-300 systems in December 
2015/January 2016.8 The S-300 is a sophisticated and effective 
weapon system that could be deployed to protect valuable targets 
and/or deny access to Iranian airspace. The fact of the matter is that 
there is always a “golden BB” out there somewhere––pilots and planes 
will be lost. As a result, additional forces will be needed on standby to 
rescue downed pilots and will also be immediately placed in harm’s 
way. 
The effort to eliminate Iran’s anti-aircraft capacity is simply the 
prelude for the real target––Iran’s powerful ballistic missile capability, 
featuring the mobile and quick to launch Sejjil I and II surface-to-
surface ballistic missile.9 To eliminate this threat, Iran’s ballistic 
missile launchers, delivery systems and production would need to be 
destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile capability must be degraded as 
quickly and as early as possible during the air campaign because Iran 
will start launching missiles at numerous targets.  Iran’s missiles can 
reach Israel, an obvious target for Iran, but also as far as 
Southeastern/Eastern Europe, and any number of U.S. and allied 
assets in between.10  Ballistic missile defense systems (e.g. Patriot and 
sea-based Aegis warships) deployed in the region to protect allies 
would only limit the damage. 
 
7. Compare The World Fact Book: United States, U.S. CENT. INTELL. 
AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html [https://perma.cc/QLG6-MKS3] (listing of 
all military branches in the US military - military expenditures as 4.35 
percent of GDP in 2012); The World Fact Book: Iran, U.S. CENT. 
INTELL. AGENCY, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html [https://perma.cc/UE6U-LNXX] (listing of all 
military branches in the Iranian military). 
8. Sneha Shankar, Russia to Hand Over First Set of S-300 Defense Missile 
System to Iran on Thursday, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-hand-over-first-set-s-300-defense-missile-
system-iran-thursday-2310525 [https://perma.cc/JQU5-4PUE]. 
9. See generally Anthony H. Cordesman & Bryan Gold, The Gulf Military 
Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions, CTR. 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/131207_gulf_military_balance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PP7H-JWKW]. 
10. See Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program, U.S. INST. PEACE 
(Aug. 2015), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-
program [https://perma.cc/4CB4-9SFR]. 
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If Iran were to selectively target lawful military objectives in 
accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, the missiles could do 
significant damage. If Iran chooses to be less selective and willingly 
violates the Law of Armed Conflict, it could rein terror from above on 
numerous civilian centers. Iran has spent so much time outside of the 
international “family of nations” that it is not beyond anyone’s 
imagination that it could view an attack from the U.S. and its allies 
as a true existential threat, and adhere to Bismarck’s maxim of not 
obeying the law in the face of losing one’s nation.11 
Lastly, with respect to any air campaign, after striking any 
targets with air power a battle damage assessment would be necessary 
to determine whether the target was destroyed, damaged, or missed. 
In other words, does the target need to be hit again and if so––how 
hard? The battle damage assessment may be accomplished with 
satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and ground presence.12 Accurate 
battle damage assessments are critical, and may be accomplished, but 
potentially with a cost to planes, pilots, and combat forces on the 
ground. 
Iran, however, is not limited to air defense and missiles. Arguably, 
Iran’s military is most dangerous on the water. The only entrance and 
exit into the Persian Gulf is through the Strait of Hormuz.13 The 
Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and therefore, all 
nations have unfettered access through the right of Transit Passage.14 
 
11. For an explanation of Bismarck’s maxim, see generally Joan Edan 
Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal 
Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31, 89 (1996).   
12. U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK FOR JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, I-1 
(June 1, 2004), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/hbk_jbda.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UTF9-ER5T]. 
13. Abdul Jalil Zayd Marhoon, How Security In Strait of Hormuz Brings 
US, Iran Closer, AL-MONITOR (June 23, 2015), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/gulf-arab-security-coordination-
hormuz-strait.html# [http://perma.cc/Z9S8-DTLN]. 
14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 37, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into 
force Nov. 16, 1994); see also Nilufer Oral, Transit Passage Rights in 
the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil 
Tankers, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. (May 3, 2012), available at 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-
rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage 
[https://perma.cc/B7JA-JGUQ] (“According to UNCLOS, the transit 
passage regime applies to âstraits [sic] which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.[] 
Iran, by its own declaration, is obliged to respect the transit passage 
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However, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy––
a hardline entity in Iranian internal politics––views this narrow and 
shallow strait as a strategic choke point, where all ships must pass, 
thereby rendering them vulnerable.15 The Persian Gulf is an 
important waterway for supporting any potential attack on Iran and 
it is perhaps even more important to the global economy by supplying 
approximately twenty percent of the world’s oil (roughly 16.5 billion 
barrels per day travel through the Strait).16 Removing that much oil 
from the global market, however, would not have the same effect it 
would have had if this occurred thirty years ago, because of the many 
non-OPEC producers today. With that said, the uncertainty of when 
the Strait would reopen to commercial traffic could influence the 
markets in a negative fashion.     
The IRGC Navy has numerous weapons at its disposal when 
trying to make things difficult for the U.S. Navy and allied navies. 
Mines are a standard feature of Persian Gulf warfare and would likely 
be deployed again in an effort to shut down the Strait.17 Iran also 
possesses approximately two-dozen midget submarines that are 
difficult to detect and have mine and torpedo capabilities.18 The 
IRGC Navy has scores of high-speed small attack boats with torpedo 
 
rights of all vessels flying the flag of states party to UNCLOS, both 
commercial and military.”).  
15. Kenneth Katman et al, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, CONG. 
RES. SERV. 5 (Jan. 23, 2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42335.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5UVG-NTEZ]. 
16. Strait of Hormuz is chokepoint for 20% of world’s oil, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2012), available at 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7830 
[http://perma.cc/PVT3-P7KA]. 
17. See David Wood, U.S., Iran Poised for Mine Warfare In the Persian 
Gulf, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/27/us-iran-mine-warfare-
persian-gulf_n_1304107.html [http://perma.cc/JWY5-F4D5] (providing 
an example of Iran’s use of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf in the 
recent past).  
18. See Fact Sheet: Iran’s Submarine Force, INST. FOR THE STUDY WAR 
(June 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-irans-submarine-
force [https://perma.cc/BGV3-J9U4] (stating that Iran has around 19 
Ghadir Class Submarines which are difficult to detect and track and are 
capable of firing large torpedoes and mines); Sam LaGrone, Iran 
Launches New Submarine Class, USNI NEWS, (Nov. 27, 2013), 
http://news.usni.org/2013/11/27/iran-launches-new-submarine-class 
[https://perma.cc/HV9L-BGLB] (calling the submarines “Ghadir-class 
midget submarine[s]”). 
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and missile capabilities.19 Lastly, the IRGC Navy has the supersonic 
Khalij-e Fars anti-ship ballistic missile (referred to as the “carrier 
killer”) that Iran boasts as accurate and devastating.20 All of these 
assets make maritime operations in this region difficult and extremely 
dangerous. Success will be achieved on the seas but will come at a 
steep price. 
Finally, there is the reality of worldwide asymmetric retaliation 
from the terrorist organizations Iran supports such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas21––not to mention the possibility of “lone wolf” terrorist 
attacks across Europe and North America. The versatility and reach 
of Hezbollah (e.g. the attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita 
Argentina in 1994)22 makes it one of the most feared weapons in 
Iran’s arsenal. Therefore, it should be of little comfort that because 
military action could not possibly eliminate all nuclear material, any 
potentially remaining material could be made available for terrorist 
attacks.  
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, an attack would in all likelihood make the 
Iranians more determined to be a nuclear power so that no one in the 
future will dare attack them again. It would make most Iranians more 
extreme on the nuclear issue and quiet any moderating voices in the 
country. The agreement gives us a more durable solution than any 
“military option” ever could.  Another positive, if not cynical view, is 
that the agreement provides access to their nuclear facilities for a 
 
19. Berenice Baker, Iran’s fast attack craft fleet: behind the hyperbole, 
NAVAL-TECHNOLOGY.COM (Jan. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.naval-technology.com/features/featureiran-fast-attack-craft-
fleet-behind-hyperbole/ [https://perma.cc/8B7B-PTWY]. 
20. Zachary Keck, Meet Iran’s “Carrier Killer”: The Khalij Fars, DIPLOMAT 
(May 13, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/meet-irans-carrier-
killer-the-khalij-fars/ [https://perma.cc/G3YV-KKDM]. 
21. See Chapter 3: Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, U.S. DEP’T STATE 
(Apr. 2015), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W6VT-WALC] (stating that “Iran has historically 
provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian 
terrorist groups,” and that “[s]ince the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah 
conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Lebanese Hizballah, in direct 
violation of UNSCR 1701. General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the 
IRGC Aerospace Force stated in November that “The IRGC and 
Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together”). 
22. Iran charged over Argentina bomb, BBC News (Oct, 25, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6085768.stm 
[https://perma.cc/5V8F-N9BJ]. 
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better intelligence picture on where everything is located if in the 
future the U.S. and its allies needs to consider military action. 
On the international level, Iran is arguably an important player in 
countering ISIS/ISIL (a.k.a. Daesh) and a U.S. attack on Iran may 
give this brutal terrorist organization more space to operate. 
Domestically, the cost in blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan 
was staggering with nearly 7,000 troops making the ultimate sacrifice 
and an estimated cost of $6 trillion in fifteen years of combat.23 
Moreover, the dollar amount doesn’t factor in the long-term cost of 
veterans’ healthcare, rendering the cost of armed conflict with Iran 
incalculable. 
Ultimately, any military strike may destabilize the entire region 
and result in wider conflict as well as have a consequential effect on 
the global economy. This is more than simply putting bombs on a 
target. Any military action will have a significant and far reaching 
impact on the region and beyond. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Face of the Fallen, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/national/fallen/ 
[https://perma.cc/CY3X-TAMR]; Mark Thompson, The True Cost of 
the Afghanistan War May Surprise You, TIME (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://time.com/3651697/afghanistan-war-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CCE-JWCC]. 
